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Abstract
The last decade saw the emergence of systematic large-scale
replication projects in the social and behavioral sciences,
(Camerer et al., 2016, 2018; Ebersole et al., 2016; Klein et al.,
2014, 2018; Collaboration, 2015). These projects were driven
by theoretical and conceptual concerns about a high frac-
tion of false positives in the scientific publications (Ioannidis,
2005)( and a high prevalence of questionable research prac-
tices (Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn, 2011). Concerns
about the credibility of research findings are not unique to
the behavioral and social sciences; within Computer Science,
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) are
areas of particular concern (Lucic et al., 2018; Freire, Bon-
net, and Shasha, 2012; Gundersen and Kjensmo, 2018; Hen-
derson et al., 2018). Given the pioneering role of the behav-
ioral and social sciences in the promotion of novel method-
ologies to improve the credibility of research, it is a promis-
ing approach to analyze the lessons learned from this field
and adjust strategies for Computer Science, AI and ML In
this paper, we review approaches used in the behavioral and
social sciences and in the DARPA SCORE project. We par-
ticularly focus on the role of human forecasting of replication
outcomes, and how forecasting can leverage the information
gained from relatively labor and resource-intensive replica-
tions. We will discuss opportunities and challenges of using
these approaches to monitor and improve the credibility of
research areas in Computer Science, AI and ML.
1 Introduction
Unreproducible scientific results will potentially mislead the
progress of science, and undermine the trustworthiness of
the research community. The last decade saw the emergence
of systematic large-scale replication projects in the social
and behavioral sciences, and other research fields (Camerer
et al., 2016, 2018; Ebersole et al., 2016; Klein et al., 2014,
2018; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). These projects
were driven by theoretical and conceptual concerns about a
high fraction of ‘false positives’ in the scientific publications
(Ioannidis, 2005) and a high prevalence of questionable re-
search practices (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011).
In these projects, a well-defined subset of the literature in a
Copyright c© 2020, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
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research field is systematically sampled, and all studies that
meet pre-defined criteria are selected for replication. Repli-
cation includes a new round of data collection based on pro-
tocols that are as similar as possible to the original protocols,
and an analysis of the new data that follows the approaches
of the original studies.
In the social and behavioral sciences, the rates of suc-
cessful replication ranged from 39% to 62% (Camerer et al.,
2016, 2018; Collaboration, 2015). Successful replication is
typically defined as a statistically significant effect that is in
the same direction as the original effect, though most repli-
cation studies provide a number of additional characteriza-
tions, including replication effect sizes. The relatively low
rates of replication have raised concerns about the credibility
of research in the social and behavioral sciences which have
been captured by the term replication crisis (Baker, 2016).
Concerns about the credibility of research findings are
not unique to the behavioral and social sciences; within
Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine
Learning (ML) are areas of particular concern. Unrepro-
ducible results have been reported across different sub-areas
such as reinforcement learning and deep learning (Lucic et
al., 2018; Freire, Bonnet, and Shasha, 2012; Gundersen and
Kjensmo, 2018; Henderson et al., 2018). The recent Na-
tional Academies’ Report (National Academies of Sciences
and Medicine, 2019) highlights computational reproducibil-
ity:
Notably, however, a number of systematic efforts to re-
produce computational results across a variety of fields
have failed in more than one-half of the attempts made,
mainly due to insufficient detail on digital artifacts,
such as data, code, and computational workflow.
The sheer scale of some efforts like supercomputer runs
on Titan mean the reproducibility is largely theoretical. We
could extend this to AlphaGo, or top Starcraft systems, or to
a lesser extent, GPT-2. The report notes,
Artificial intelligence and machine learning present
unique new challenges to computational reproducibil-
ity, and as these fields continue to grow, the techniques
and approaches for documenting and capturing the rel-
evant parameters to enable reproducibility and confir-
mation of study results needs to keep pace.
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And generally,
The committees definition of reproducibility is focused
on computation because of its major and increasing
role in science. ... but this [data] revolution is not yet
uniformly reflected in how scientists develop and use
software and how scientific results are published and
shared. These shortfalls have implications for repro-
ducibility, because scientists who wish to reproduce re-
search may lack the information or training they need
to do so.
Given the pioneering role of the behavioral and social sci-
ences in the promotion of novel methodologies to improve
the credibility of research, it is promising to analyze the
lessons learned from this field and adjust strategies for Com-
puter Science, AI and ML.
The authors of this position paper come from both com-
puter science and the behavioral and social sciences, and
collaborate on Replication Markets – one part of the larger
DARPA-funded program on Systematizing Confidence in
Open Research and Evidence (SCORE) (DARPA, 2018).
We are one of two teams using crowdsourcing to rate the
credibility of over 6,000 social and behavioral science re-
search claims, by predicting the chance they would replicate
successfully, in a high-power test.
The power of human prediction has been studied in many
contexts (e.g. (Tetlock and Gardner, 2016)), but less so in
the replication and assessment of scientific results. If we can
scalably assess the quality of a published article (or its as-
sociated claims) via replicability (or reproducibility) scores,
this could help readers assess reliability when making de-
cisions, rather than assuming that all published studies are
the same. Secondly, these scores allow us to prioritize ex-
pensive replication efforts towards maximum information,
minimum regret, or some other goal.. Lastly, these assess-
ments can serve as an incentive to motivate authors to better
ensure their replicability.
After discussing how forecasting can leverage the infor-
mation gained from relatively labor and resource-intensive
replications, we will then review opportunities and chal-
lenges of using these approaches to monitor and improve
the credibility of research areas in Computer Science, AI
and ML. We end with details of our efforts in the DARPA
SCORE project.
2 Related Work
Replication crisis in science As noted above, recent
works have shown relatively low replication rates for various
social sciences, in both “one-word” journals (e.g. Science
and Nature) and more specialized ones. Despite some varia-
tion between fields, their overall low replication rates sug-
gests unreliable practices (Christensen and Miguel, 2018;
Rahal, Collaboration, and others, 2015; Baker, 2016)
Replication in AI AI is no exception to concerns about
replicability. Several reports claim the stated performance
of a documented ML method can not be (fully) reproduced,
including deep reinforcement learning (Henderson et al.,
2018) and generative adversarial networks (Lucic et al.,
2018). There are other critiques in a more generic compu-
tation and machine learning context (Freire, Bonnet, and
Shasha, 2012; Gundersen and Kjensmo, 2018; Bouthillier,
Laurent, and Vincent, 2019).
(Gundersen and Kjensmo, 2018) surveyed state-of-the-art
results in two premier AI venues AAAI and IJCAI. Instead
of performing replication studies over a selected pool of 500
published articles, the authors identified a set of relevant
proxy signals and determined a replication score from those.
Prediction market for replication A prediction market is
a market place for strategic agents to trade their private infor-
mation (Hanson, 2003, 1995; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006).
Prediction markets have shown to be able to aggregate infor-
mation efficiently. Particularly, Hanson promoted the idea of
using a prediction market to build a gambling place for “sav-
ing science” (Hanson, 1995). A key property of a prediction
market is to incentivize agents to truthfully report their be-
liefs.
We next review several prediction markets on scientific
replications.
3 Prediction Markets for Replication
Elicitation
A prediction market allows participants to trade contracts
that will eventually pay out based on the true outcome. A
replication market pays based on actual attempted repli-
cations. (Typically we require the replication to be higher
power than the original study, to reduce false negatives.)
Contracts are typically “Pays $1 if Yes” or “Pays $1 if No,”
so the current price is the market’s estimate of the probabil-
ity for that outcome. A single replication is only a proxy for
truth, but one can perform a Bayesian update (Dreber et al.,
2015).
Four of the large-scale replications in the social and be-
havioral sciences were accompanied by forecasting stud-
ies. These studies aimed to investigate if the research com-
munity can forecast replication outcomes. In the first study
(Dreber et al., 2015), we elicited forecasts on 41 of the repli-
cations conducted as part of the Replication Project Psy-
chology (RPP; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). Studies
2 and 3 combined replications and forecasting, for 18 stud-
ies in experimental economics (Camerer et al., 2016), and
for 21 experimental social science studies published in Na-
ture and Science (Camerer et al., 2018). The fourth study
(Forsell et al., 2018) was conducted together with the Many-
Labs 2 study (Klein et al., 2018), and elicited forecasts for
the replicability of 24 classical and contemporary psychol-
ogy studies.
For these 104 claims, we elicited forecasts through un-
incentivized surveys followed by prediction markets. The
markets ran for about 2 weeks. Participants were recruited
from the relevant research communities using mailing lists
and blog posts. In total, using a simple binary criterion
in interpreting forecasts, prediction markets correctly pre-
dicted the replication outcomes for 73% of 104 studies. Av-
erage survey responses were highly correlated with market
forecasts but were somewhat less accurate. The forecasting
projects demonstrated that prediction markets are suitable
tools to elicit forecasts about the credibility of research find-
ings from the research community.
4 The Challenges and Possibilities of
Forecasting for AI Replication
Existing literature on assessing replication in AI has focused
on tabulating proxy signals of replications for each of the
published articles (Gundersen and Kjensmo, 2018). While
this is a very inspiring and clever way to deal with the mas-
sive amount of papers published at AI venues, it is
• not a direct assessment of the papers themselves;
• not scalable for the exponentially growing number of sub-
missions and published articles in AI.
We next will explain why we think forecasting might be a
good fit for assessing AI replicability. In particular, we think
that systematic claim sampling, and crowd forecasting are
relevant.
4.1 Definition of Replication
Although the National Academies (National Academies of
Sciences and Medicine, 2019) has recently tied ”reproduc-
tion” to running the same code on the same data, and ”repli-
cation” to new data and/or methods, the AI community has
typically reversed them. Regardless, we need to consider
how replications will be performed, what counts as suc-
cess, and what is being tested. Following (Gundersen and
Kjensmo, 2018), we note three criteria for reproducibility in
AI :
• Method reproducibility
• Result reproducibility
• Inferential reproducibility
Each of the definitions can form a forecasting question:
“Is the paper/claim method/result/inferential
reproducible?”.
For all three criteria of replication, we argue that forecasting
provides a sensible, useful and scalable way of collecting
assessments.
Method reproducibility is the easiest to check, in AI.
In light of the reproducibility crisis, major conferences in
AI/ML (e.g., ICML, NeurIPS, AAAI, ICLR) encourage au-
thors to share and publish their codes. This practice allows
an easy way to check replication in AI via re-running the
codes shared/published by authors. Though a relatively easy
task, often people lack incentives to report the results of such
attempts. Our incentive structures can help - though by itself
this is not “forecasting”. Similar to NAS’ “computational re-
producibility.”
Result reproducibility requires testing promoted methods
over a different set of data. This task is suitable for our
crowdsourcing approaches. With properly built incentives,
we can hope to motivate relevant participants (e.g., graduate
students) to test published methods over different datasets
they have access to, and report their results, via either par-
ticipating in our prediction market or the surveys.
Inferential reproducibility requires replicating the main
claims made in the paper with a different implementation
and on a different dataset. This is the most strict definition
of replication in AI and is a much trickier procedure to ver-
ify the replication of a reported result. Here in particular it
would be useful to forecast widely, and check a subset. Fore-
casting provides a cheap and quick way to estimate a confi-
dence score for this type of replication.
Gunderson & Kjensmo emphasize independent teams
working only from the documentation. Their goal is to en-
sure results are due the AI method, not irrelevant details
like hardware or environment, so they do not require a new
dataset:
Reproducibility in empirical AI research is the ability
of an independent research team to produce the same
results using the same AI method based on the docu-
mentation made by the original research team.
This also takes time, and would benefit from informed fore-
casts, a subset of which are checked.
4.2 Replication Market for AI
Claim extraction Published articles typically present
multiple major conclusions and claims, including tackling
open problems, presenting computationally efficient solu-
tions (not necessarily solving a new problem), outperform-
ing benchmark solutions, etc. Most of the current studies re-
quire manual extraction, though SCORE appears to be build-
ing in some automation. Automated claim extraction would
greatly benefit replication studies.
We can build one replication market for each ex-
tracted claim, asking participants “Is [this claim]
method/result/inferential/. . . reproducible?”. Typically
we have used binary outcomes, but it’s also possible to
forecast metrics like accuracy, or multiple outcomes. Once
the markets settle, we can select a subset to test. For
SCORE, this was a stratified random sample. But if we
adopt a decision-market scoring rule (SCORE, Section 5.2),
we can use the market results to select the claims to test,
according to our goals.
Meta claims Besides forecasting replication questions for
individual claims, we also find it useful to collect forecasts
for meta claims on the overall replication rate for a field. For
instance, we can ask participants to forecast “What is the
average replication rate in Natural Language Processing?”.
Survey approach Prior to or instead of markets, we can
use surveys. Surveys open up possibilities for weighted fore-
casts, including using peer prediction approaches (e.g., SSR,
Section 5.3) to incentivize participation. Existing platforms
such as openreview (https://openreview.net/) provide a very
convenient way to obtain/crowdsource opinions and com-
ments about a scientific report, but these platforms in general
lack a mechanisms to properly motivate voluntary participa-
tion.
4.3 Implications for AI
Forecasting might help solve the peer review shortage in
major AI/ML conferences. AI conference submissions have
been growing exponentially fast. For instance, AAAI 2020
received 8,800+ submissions. While this shows enormous
interest in AI, it poses a substantial reviewing challenge.
With an overwhelming number of papers to review, more
reviewers will be needed, causing the average qualification
of reviewers to decrease.
Quick replication forecasts can provide an informative
signal to the program committee to make early “desk re-
jection” decisions or perhaps to prioritize spot-checking the
studies rated non-replicable. (When market results affect
resolutions, decision-market scoring must be used to prevent
improper incentives.)
Besides forecasting articles’ replications, our approach
will also allow us to elicit forecasts on other proxy signals
such as forecasted number of citations in the next few years.
This information can also be elicited during pre-submission
time, and inform the program committee.
Improve the progress of AI Leaving the judgment of sci-
entific credibility in AI to the general crowd sounds danger-
ous. But the availability of predictions about a claim’s repli-
cability may help the community and editors better judge
the value of a reported claim (DellaVigna, Pope, and Vivalt,
2019). For instance, having a sense of the research commu-
nity’s expectation gives researchers a certain form of “prior”
for the corresponding study, which helps calibrate the sur-
prises of a reported claim. Because forecasts may be judged,
participants have some incentive to report truthfully.
5 DARPA SCORE
In 2019, DARPA announced the SCORE program to create
confidence scores for a large pool (3,000) of publications
from the social and behavioural sciences. The motivation
and goal of SCORE states as follows:
The Department of Defense (DoD) often leverages so-
cial and behavioral science (SBS) research to design
plans, guide investments, assess outcomes, and build
models of human social systems and behaviors as they
relate to national security challenges in the human do-
main. However, a number of recent empirical studies
and meta-analyses have revealed that many SBS results
vary dramatically in terms of their ability to be inde-
pendently reproduced or replicated, which could have
real-world implications for DoDs plans, decisions, and
models.
Although SCORE includes both the replicating teams and
teams developing machine learning models to score an ar-
ticle or claim, our team focuses on eliciting human beliefs
about a variety of metrics relevant to replication. For in-
stance, for each field of studies, we are interested in knowing
peoples estimates of the average replication rate.
For each particular article, another team (the Center for
Open Science) first extracts the main claims. We then elicit
people’s following two estimates:
• Estimate of its probability of being replicated, defined as a
statistically significant result in the same direction, when
using substantially the same method and analysis, but new
data and likely a much larger sample size (direct replica-
tion).
• Estimate of its probability of being replicated if we did
exactly the same analysis on a novel but “found” dataset,
such as GDP figures from later years, or a different coun-
try (data replication).
A challenge in this project is that only a small fraction of
these studies will actually be selected for replication (∼ 100
direct and ∼ 150 data replications), thus forecasting ap-
proaches to create these confidence scores had to function
with ground truth becoming available only for a small frac-
tion of the forecasts. We therefore used two different ap-
proaches to deal with the high rate of unverifiable outcomes,
decision markets (Chen et al., 2011), and surrogate scoring
rules (SSR) (Liu and Chen, 2018).
Scale Accuracy Non-resolution Scope
Figure 1: Overview of our project for SCORE, highlighting
the three components and challenges.
Our project features
• a continuation of using prediction market for eliciting es-
timates of replications;
• a decision market that uses crowd forecast to inform tar-
geted replication efforts;
• a peer prediction approach that incentivizes participation
without using ground truth outcome of the replicability of
articles.
5.1 Replication Market
A primary component of our project is a prediction market,
which we call a replication market. Fig. 2 shows the wel-
come page of the market we built. Once they arrive, partic-
ipants can choose the topics and their interests and find the
relevant markets/claims to engage. Our front page presents
a leaderboard that shows the top performers.
For our first round of replication markets, we successfully
recruited 508 eligible participants (finished registration sur-
veys), and had in total 218 active traders, who made 1,729
trades. We now have over 1,500 eligible participants, and
about 150 active. We completed surveys and markets for
both Round 1 ( 300 claims) and Round 2 ( 200 claims).
Claims and the associated key statistics were extracted to
present to our participants to help with their assessments. In
Figure 2: Overview of replication market we built.
https://www.replicationmarkets.com/
each Round, the first week is individual surveys, followed
by two weeks where all traders can see and select all claims.
See Fig. 3 for an example. Both the survey and the market
present detailed claims summaries, with the option to click
through to the full text.
Figure 3: Claims, key statistics and pointers presented to our
participants.
5.2 Decision Market for Targeted Spot-check
In a prediction market, participants are rewarded according
to the closeness of their predictions to the future resolved
event outcome. They are hence incentivized to provide their
most accurate assessments on the event. With limited re-
sources, we simply won’t be able to check every paper’s
replication. In other words, our questions are not going to
be resolved, and the majority of the prediction markets wont
pay off. This creates a challenge for using prediction mar-
kets to obtain an accurate assessment for all studies, includ-
ing the non-resolved ones: market participants, conjecturing
or knowing which studies will be selected may focus their
effort on predicting these studies because their bets in other
markets likely wont materialize.
Moreover, we hope that in the future, accurate confidence
scores will inform replication decisions, to more efficiently
allocate scarce replication resources over a large number of
studies (e.g. attempt replication for more studies whose con-
fidence scores are low). However, when market predictions
may influence which studies will be selected for replication,
a market participant may manipulate market predictions so
that studies for those markets where he has higher poten-
tial payoffs are attempted for replication. The interaction be-
tween predictions and decisions can affect the accuracy of
the predictions.
We use decision markets to address both challenges. A
decision market is a set of prediction markets coupled with a
stochastic decision rule. For each study, there is a prediction
market eliciting forecasts on the probability that the result
of the study will be reproduced if a replication of the study
is attempted. The decision rule specifies the probability to
conduct a replication for each study a simple rule would be
a flat 5% chance.
To ensure incentive compatibility, if a replication for
study i is attempted, the decision market scales market par-
ticipants’ payoffs in the prediction market for study i by the
inverse of the probability that the study is selected for repli-
cation, i.e. by 1/pi. Markets corresponding to studies that
are not selected do not pay off. When every study has a non-
zero probability of selection, market participants are incen-
tivized to maximize their expected payoff in each market as
if there will be replication attempts on all studies. Such a
decision market preserves incentive compatibility.
5.3 Survey method: a Peer Prediction Approach
The market approach has two limitations for our SCORE
project:
• The markets will need the ground truth outcome of each
articles reproducibility to close.
• Even for the articles chosen for reproduction, the out-
comes only arrive after a year. The delay in paying out
will potentially hurt participants’ engagements.
To improve the incentives and participation, we imple-
mented and tested a novel surrogate scoring technique (Liu
and Chen, 2018; Wang, Liu, and Chen, 2019) designed to
yield incentive-compatible estimates on non-resolving ques-
tions. Eliciting confidence scores for scientific claims is
a problem of information elicitation without verification.
Replications can better approximate the ground truth, but
only a small fraction of studies can be attempted for replica-
tions. Hence we test our surrogate scoring technique.
Surrogate scoring rule When we know the ground truth,
we can use a strictly proper scoring rule (e.g. the Brier score)
incentivizes people to offer their most accurate predictions.
But when the ground truth is not available, hope is not lost.
If there is a surrogate for the ground truth, with known er-
ror rates, then surrogate scoring rules can score predictions
using this proxy truth to provide the same incentive as using
a proper scoring rule with access to the ground truth. Sup-
pose we are predicting whether a particular scientific claim
is true (1) or false (0). Let o for outcome be the unobservable
ground truth. If we will have access to surrogate ground truth
os where we know the error rates, e0 = P (os = 1|o = 0)
and e1 = P (os = 0|o = 1), then we can define the follow-
ing surrogate scoring rule to score a prediction p:
SSR(p, os) =
(1− e1−os) · S(p, os)− eos · S(p, 1− os)
1− e0 − e1
A nice property of the above surrogate scoring rule is that
when a prediction p is evaluated against the surrogate out-
come os, the surrogate score in expectation equals the Brier
score for the prediction, evaluated against the true outcome
o. Thus, predictions are as if scored against the ground truth
using the Brier score.
The remaining challenge is how to find a surrogate ground
truth with known error rates. Our SSR method achieves this
under some assumptions by estimating a surrogate ground
truth and its error rates from the predictions of all partic-
ipants across multiple questions. The error of the estima-
tion converges to 0 as the number of predictions increases.
Hence, the average surrogate score that a participant gets
converges to the average Brier score that he would get if
ground truth were available. Fig. 4 shows how surrogate
scores (no access to ground truth) compare with Brier scores
(with access to ground truth) on an experimental data set on
predicting whether prices of some art pieces exceed a certain
value.
Figure 4: Surrogate scores (denoted as DTS) v.s. true scores
of participants’ performance
Because surrogate scores recover Brier scores in expec-
tation and Brier scores quantify the quality of predictions
(i.e. more accurate predictions lead to better Brier scores in
expectation), we also want to explore using surrogate scor-
ing techniques to post-process elicited predictions to obtain
more accurate CS. In forming an aggregated CS, predictions
with higher surrogate score will be weighted higher, while
the exact weights depend on the estimated error rates of the
surrogate ground truth.
Due to the lack of ground truth verification, we cannot
claim too much about whether we have identified the real
best experts. But we performed a cross validation check be-
tween the SSR weighted aggregation with the market ag-
gregated outcomes. We generally observe a strong correla-
tion among these responses (Fig.5). This is a positive signal
about SSR’s informativeness, if we believe both surveys and
markets are correlating with the true performances in a cer-
tain way.
Figure 5: A cross validation check of SSR elicited and ag-
gregated survey answers and market responses.
5.4 Takeaways
Through our previous studies, our main takeaways are
• To fully embrace the wisdom of crowd, we need to use
approaches that scale well and automatic i.e. market ap-
proaches ( prediction and decision markets) and SSR.
• Better engage participants. With actively recruiting and
engaging participants, we are able to maintain a relatively
diverse and informative population to contribute fore-
casts. Our efforts in engaging participants include sending
monthly prizes for winners in our survey studies (high-
lighted later), maintaining leaderboard of top performers,
sending monthly emails to remind participants.
• Maintaining a diverse population also means that we have
a participation population with different backgrounds. We
design simple and easy-to-use interface, tutorials, as well
as FAQ pages to let our participants understand the basic
concepts of our project and the definitions of questions we
are eliciting forecasts for.
Monthly prize giving Besides active outreach activities,
we gave out prizes for participation monthly. This is a new
component we tested in comparing to other forecasting ef-
forts. This is a challenging task to do as we do not have
ground truth outcomes to select the winner in forecasting
until much later in the program. Waiting until then might
significantly discourage the participation. The design of SSR
(Section 4.3) allows us to do so.
Specifically, our questions arrive in batches, and each
month (we also call this each round) has 30 batches of
questions for users to answer, with each batch consisting of
claims to forecast on. SSR scores are computed for each
batch of questions every month for every participant. We
then use SSR to rank participants and give prizes to the top
performers of each batch. We do observe a boost in partici-
pation and engagement after we gave out prizes. This is fur-
ther evidenced by tweets from our participants mentioning
that they won awards, acknowledging winning prizes on per-
sonal websites and blogs. We have summarized the statistics
of our given prizes in the first four rounds in the follow-
ing article: https://www.replicationmarkets.com/index.php/
2020/01/02/robustness-of-monthly-prizes/
Acknowledgement
This work is funded by the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) and Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Center Pacific (SSC Pacific) under Contract No.
N66001-19-C-4014. The views and conclusions contained
herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted
as necessarily representing the official policies, either ex-
pressed or implied, of DARPA, SSC Pacific or the U.S. Gov-
ernment. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce
and distribute reprints for governmental purposes notwith-
standing any copyright annotation therein.
References
Baker, M. 2016. Is there a reproducibility crisis? a na-
ture survey lifts the lid on how researchers view the’crisis
rocking science and what they think will help. Nature
533(7604):452–455.
Bouthillier, X.; Laurent, C.; and Vincent, P. 2019. Unre-
producible research is reproducible. In Chaudhuri, K.,
and Salakhutdinov, R., eds., Proceedings of the 36th In-
ternational Conference on Machine Learning, volume 97
of Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, 725–734.
Long Beach, California, USA: PMLR.
Camerer, C. F.; Dreber, A.; Forsell, E.; Ho, T.-H.; Huber,
J.; Johannesson, M.; Kirchler, M.; Almenberg, J.; Alt-
mejd, A.; Chan, T.; et al. 2016. Evaluating replica-
bility of laboratory experiments in economics. Science
351(6280):1433–1436.
Camerer, C. F.; Dreber, A.; Holzmeister, F.; Ho, T.-H.; Hu-
ber, J.; Johannesson, M.; Kirchler, M.; Nave, G.; Nosek,
B. A.; Pfeiffer, T.; et al. 2018. Evaluating the repli-
cability of social science experiments in nature and sci-
ence between 2010 and 2015. Nature Human Behaviour
2(9):637.
Chen, Y.; Kash, I.; Ruberry, M.; and Shnayder, V. 2011.
Decision markets with good incentives. In International
Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, 72–83.
Springer.
Christensen, G., and Miguel, E. 2018. Transparency, re-
producibility, and the credibility of economics research.
Journal of Economic Literature 56(3):920–80.
Collaboration, O. S. 2015. Estimating the reproducibility of
psychological science. Science 349(6251):aac4716.
DARPA. 2018. Systematizing Confidence
in Open Research and Evidence (SCORE).
DARPA/DSO Broad Agency Announcement
HR001118S0047. Retrieved from https://research-
vp.tau.ac.il/sites/resauth.tau.ac.il/files/DARPA-SCORE-
DSO-2018.pdf.
DellaVigna, S.; Pope, D.; and Vivalt, E. 2019. Predict sci-
ence to improve science. Science 366(6464):428–429.
Dreber, A.; Pfeiffer, T.; Almenberg, J.; Isaksson, S.; Wil-
son, B.; Chen, Y.; Nosek, B. A.; and Johannesson, M.
2015. Using prediction markets to estimate the repro-
ducibility of scientific research. Proceedings of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences 112(50):15343–15347.
Ebersole, C. R.; Atherton, O. E.; Belanger, A. L.; Skul-
borstad, H. M.; Allen, J. M.; Banks, J. B.; Baranski, E.;
Bernstein, M. J.; Bonfiglio, D. B.; Boucher, L.; et al.
2016. Many labs 3: Evaluating participant pool quality
across the academic semester via replication. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology 67:68–82.
Forsell, E.; Viganola, D.; Pfeiffer, T.; Almenberg, J.; Wilson,
B.; Chen, Y.; Nosek, B. A.; Johannesson, M.; and Dreber,
A. 2018. Predicting replication outcomes in the many
labs 2 study. Journal of Economic Psychology.
Freire, J.; Bonnet, P.; and Shasha, D. 2012. Computational
reproducibility: State-of-the-art, challenges, and database
research opportunities. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM
SIGMOD International Conference on Management of
Data, SIGMOD ’12, 593–596. New York, NY, USA:
ACM.
Gundersen, O. E., and Kjensmo, S. 2018. State of the art:
Reproducibility in artificial intelligence. In Thirty-Second
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
Hanson, R. 1995. Could gambling save science? encourag-
ing an honest consensus.
Hanson, R. 2003. Combinatorial information market design.
Information Systems Frontiers 5(1):107–119.
Henderson, P.; Islam, R.; Bachman, P.; Pineau, J.; Precup,
D.; and Meger, D. 2018. Deep reinforcement learning that
matters. In Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence.
Ioannidis, J. P. 2005. Why most published research findings
are false. PLoS medicine 2(8):e124.
Klein, R. A.; Ratliff, K. A.; Vianello, M.; Adams Jr, R. B.;
Bahnı´k, Sˇ.; Bernstein, M. J.; Bocian, K.; Brandt, M. J.;
Brooks, B.; Brumbaugh, C. C.; et al. 2014. Theory build-
ing through replication: Response to commentaries on the
many labs replication project.
Klein, R. A.; Vianello, M.; Hasselman, F.; Adams, B. G.;
Adams Jr, R. B.; Alper, S.; Aveyard, M.; Axt, J. R.; Ba-
balola, M. T.; Bahnı´k, Sˇ.; et al. 2018. Many labs 2: In-
vestigating variation in replicability across samples and
settings. Advances in Methods and Practices in Psycho-
logical Science 1(4):443–490.
Liu, Y., and Chen, Y. 2018. Surrogate scoring rules and a
dominant truth serum. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.09158.
Lucic, M.; Kurach, K.; Michalski, M.; Gelly, S.; and Bous-
quet, O. 2018. Are gans created equal? a large-scale
study. In Advances in neural information processing sys-
tems, 700–709.
National Academies of Sciences, E., and Medicine. 2019.
Reproducibility and Replicability in Science. Washington,
DC: The National Academies Press.
Rahal, R.; Collaboration, O. S.; et al. 2015. Estimat-
ing the reproducibility of psychological science. Science
349(6251):aac4716.
Simmons, J. P.; Nelson, L. D.; and Simonsohn, U. 2011.
False-positive psychology: Undisclosed flexibility in data
collection and analysis allows presenting anything as sig-
nificant. Psychological science 22(11):1359–1366.
Tetlock, P. E., and Gardner, D. 2016. Superforecasting: The
art and science of prediction. Random House.
Wang, J.; Liu, Y.; and Chen, Y. 2019. Forecast aggregation
via peer prediction.
Wolfers, J., and Zitzewitz, E. 2006. Prediction markets in
theory and practice. Technical report, national bureau of
economic research.
